In Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes describes the paradox of infatuation with an object and the problems of simultaneously addressing it "scientifically." He is torn between languages and describes a desperate resistance to "any reductive system": Then I decided that this disorder and this dilemma, revealed by my desire to write on Photography, corresponded to a discomfort I had always suffered from: the uneasiness of being a subject torn between two languages, one expressive, the other critical; and at the heart of this critical language, between several discourses, those of sociology, of semiology, and of psychoanalysis -but that, by ultimate dissatisfaction with all of them, I was bearing witness to the only sure thing that was in me (however naive it may be): a desperate resistance to any reductive system. 
1 Barthes does not elaborate on his use of the two terms. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://www.rep.roudedge.com/philosophy; all the following quotations are from the web site and can easily be searched there) refers to Ramon Llull who in the Spanish middle ages "developed a complicated combinatory logic ... which offered an ingenious foretaste of our current axiomated logics." According to the encyclopedia, his thought "contains the seeds of the mathesis universalis, which served as the basis for European Rationalism as developed later by Descartes and Leibniz." Descartes' rules of method "were interpreted as recommendations to start with a few simple and acknowledged notions (axioms) and thence to proceed to unkonwn ones (theorems). ... The supporters of such an interpretation maintained that the axiomatic-deductive method should replace logic and be the fundamental features that need to be taken into consideration: they invent the past as much as they record or retell it, and even if the strategies vary, they all relate to that same event, and often in profoundly similar ways, across or beyond generic boundaries. There are essential intertextual relations between all the narratives in question. And yet, each narrative resists sweeping statements: needless to say, as natrative, a graphic novel differs widely from a movie or a novel. Each narrative stages and re-enacts the event in its own way.
Significantly, the generic forms I have suggested ("novel," "epic poetry") often fall short in "defining" the constitutive elements of the narratives. 4 As a result, I indeed find myself wishing fot a mathesis singularis for each new form. It is this conflict I wish to address here. Particularly, I wish to contrast how the wish for a mathesis universalis finds expression in recent attempts to rearticulate theories of "nonfiction," and how, at the same time, the practice of interdisciplinary analysis calls for theories that revolve around "conceptualizations" rather than systemic methodology, an approach reminiscent of Barthes' "curious notion" of a mathesis singularis. 5 See Frye 1957 and any introduction to structuralism. Frye believes that literary criticism should "acquire something of the methodological discipline and coherence of the sciences", but several critics have found his approach "excessively schematic" (Lodge 1995: 421) . "There is a place for classification in criticism ... The strong emotional repugnance felt by many critics toward any form of schematization in poetics is again the result of a failure to distinguish criticism as a body of knowledge from the direct experience of literature, where every act is unique, and classification has no place," Frye claims in his "Polemical Introduction" to Anatomy of Criticism (1957: 29). "Structuralism," as proposed by cultural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, normally refers to a form of analysis informed by Saussure's linguistic model. Structuralism considers cultural phenomena as a signifying structure, "a combination of signs that have a set significance for the members of a particular culture," and analysis explains how phenomena achieve their "cultural significance, and what that significance is, by reference to an underlying system" (Abrams 1993: 280 Bal's contention is that initial classification and the application of a consistent theoretical apparatus in analysis too easily promotes dichotomy. When a value system is appropriated to the apparatus, it potentially disqualifies a specific kind of narrative that is formative for collective memory in particular ways. A classification that promotes a "fiction'V'nonfiction" dichotomy can therefore potentially seclude the historical event from the realm of "fiction," and leave it to the documentarist or the historian to treat it in narrative. Bal therefore cautions against a confusion of understanding and axiology, against a sense of "value inherent in narrative." The danger is that narrative is either understood as "true, hence, good" or as "intrinsically false, fictional, manipulative, hence, bad" (223). In either case the essential tension that is integral to a specific vision of history is neglected.
The attempt to describe a type, to distinguish it, and to test its occurrence and systemic function in relation to
The reasons for cautioning against an axiology of "fiction"/"nonfiction" are, then, partly ideological. Bal's approach to "close reading" is definitely anti-totalitarian. She insists that no academic discipline can function without a notion of the concept of meaning (26), a view that is reminiscent of for example Bakhtin's textual/cultural approach, since Bakhtin insisted on any text as simultaneously "polyphonic" and "laden." Bal does not, however, embrace "the disabused endorsement of undecidability" (91-2).
Meaning is not forever delayed, it is rather articulated and re-articulated in interpretation, securing an ongoing questioning of textual authority.
In the case of the Kennedy assassination the narrativity in what John
Hellmann refers to as an "unbounded cultural space" is a battle of cultural authority (Hellmann 1997: x).
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On this battleground, the narratives I analyze co-exist with an abundance of narratives that claim to be "objective" and "scientific," and thereby present a closure in terms of meaning. They "stage" the historical event and may therefore be said to "play with meaning." The question of "truth" is as contested as ever when a story of the past is told, and this is particularly the case in the unsolved murder mystery of a president. 12 W. J. T. Mitchell explains in an interview how he, when working with Picture Theory (1994), wished to "silence the theoretical chatter" and "let pictures talk and to allow images to attain some kind of theoretical status" (Mitchell 2000: 2). Instead of trying to "replace" the object with commentary, Michell wishes to "let pictures 'do' theory and give theory a physical, visible, figured body" (ibid): "the aim is to investigate the ways in which these forms theorize themselves, not to apply theory imported from some academic discipline" (3). 13 In the humanities, the rise of a journal such as Rethinking History reflects a need for "a new form of historical writing" (cfr. call for papers, http://hsozkult.geschichte.huberlin.de/termine/1998/cminial0.htm) that problematizes a polarity of "objectlanguage" and "meta-language." The editors of the journal invite contributions that are "Miniatures," for which the only requirements are that the topic "be in some way historical and the length no more than 1500 words... the subject matter of a Miniature need only be limited by the imagination and inventiveness of the historian. Like all contributions to Rethinking History, Miniatures will be refereed -by standards appropriate to the form." Editors Robert A. Rosenstone and Alan Munslow suggest that contributors send them "vest pocket biographies, poetic reflections, personal encounters, outrageous reinterpretations." 332 dichotomies" between "the world of value and the world of fact, the subjective and the objective, or the intuitive and the inductive" and use these to distinguish art from science (Kuhn 1977: 340). Kuhn finds "disquieting" that "the distinction between artist and scientist or between their products seems to evade us" when we ate "deploying our subdest analytic apparatus." However, this is "due less to their intrinsic similarity than to the failure of the tools we use for close scrutiny." Kuhn propagates a search for an "alternate set" of tools, and hopes to find "entry points" in a reconsideration of parallels between science and art drawn by E. M. Hafner from three areas, "products," "activity," and "response" (341). Central to Kuhn's argument is the difference between the goals of art and science. In the arts "the aesthetic is itself the goal of the work," whereas in the sciences it is "a tool" (342). Sciences are to "unlock the puzzle." Whereas the artist "also has puzzles to solve, whether of perspective, coloration, brush technique, or framing edge" their soludon is not "the aim of his work but rather a means to his attainment" (347).
Obviously, Kuhn refers in these passages to the painter-artist, the epitome of traditional artistimages. However, the conflicting modes of thought described by Kuhn in a different essay as "convergent" and "divergent," resulting in a "tension" which is "essential" to "the very best sort 
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